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策略性地不确定能否阻遏逃税行为?——一项关于稽税规则的实验研究

作者:未填写
报告主题:策略性地不确定能否阻遏逃税行为?——一项关于稽税规则的实验研究(Can Strategic Uncertainty Help Deter Tax Evasion? -- An Experiment on Auditing Rules)
< font class="ecxApple-style-span" face="arial, verdana, sans-serif">报告摘要:This paper adds to the economic-psychological research on tax compliance through experimentally testing of a simple auditing rule that induces strategic uncertainty among taxpayers. We compare a flat-rate rule, where taxpayers are told about a constant audit probability, with a bounded rule, where taxpayers are informed of the maximum number of audits. The experimental evidence suggests that, as theoretically predicted, a bounded rule induces the same level of compliance as a flat-rate rule when strategic uncertainty is low, and a high level of compliance when strategic uncertainty is high. The bounded rule also suppresses the "bomb crater" effect often observed i n previous studies. The results suggest that strategic uncertainty from the interactions of taxpayers could be a powerful source to deter tax evasion.
论文可在其个人主页下载,个人主页为:http://www.tax.mpg.de/en/pub/public_economics/public_economics_people/fangfang_tan.cfm。

报告人:谭芳芳 (Fangfang Tan )

报告时间:2011年12月21日下午3:00-5:00
报告地点:管理学院503
来源:未填写

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