喜讯 | 我院博士后刘震埙在国际期刊Games and Economic Behavior发表论文

Digital platforms may manipulate customer reviews to impede other consumers from acquiring accurate information and to increase sales. In a rational inattention setting where consumers acquire information about product quality before making purchasing decisions, we show that the platform has incentives to restrict information acquisition in the presence of consumers with wishful thinking. These biased consumers are unaware of their bias and weigh any good news about the product quality more heavily than a Bayesian consumer. We identify the conditions under which the firm optimally constrains information acquisition, and characterize when competition can alleviate this type of exploitation. Our results extend to a broader class of non-Bayesian rules beyond wishful thinking.

// 期刊简介//

Games and Economic Behavior是博弈论领域的国际顶级期刊，专注于博弈论及其在经济学和其它学科中的应用，极具学术影响力。

// 作者简介//

刘震埙，现任暨南大学产业经济研究院博士后。研究领域包括行为经济学理论和实验经济学。担任Management Science，Games and Economic Behavior，Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Economic Inquiry等期刊的匿名审稿人。