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Who Are More Naïve? High or Low Trustors

作者:admin来源:发布时间:2017-06-23 06:31:02 浏览次数:53

内容简介: 暨南大学产业大数据应用与经济决策实验室学术报告(二)时间:4月25日(周一)上午10:00-11:30地点:科学馆506主讲人:陈叶烽副教授讲座题
暨南大学产业大数据应用与经济决策实验室学术报告(二)


时间:4月25日(周一)上午10:00-11:30
地点:科学馆506
主讲人:陈叶烽副教授

讲座题目:Who Are More Naïve? High or Low Trustors

内容简介:Whether trustful people are more or less sensitive than skeptical ones to cues on others’ trustworthiness is an open question, which only recently attracted scholar’s attention. We investigate this issue by means of a trust game experiment in which subjects repeatedly face opponents belonging to a high- or a low-trustworthiness group. We find that high and low trustors are equally able to distinguish which group is more trustworthy, and to condition their trust accordingly. However, when subjects can choose whether or not to receive information on the outcome of their own past interactions, high trustors learn whom to trust or distrust faster. Our interpretation is that they are less susceptible to the anticipated aversive emotions aroused by the potential betrayal and thereby are more keen to acquire useful information about their partner’s behavior.    


主讲人简介:
陈叶烽,浙江大学经济学院副教授,浙江大学经济学博士毕业,长期从事实验经济学和行为经济学研究。主持和参与了国家自然科学基金青年项目,国家社科基金重大项目,国家社会科学基金重点项目、教育部哲学社会科学研究后期资助重大项目。在《经济研究》(4篇)、《管理世界》(3篇)、《世界经济》(2篇)、《经济学季刊》(1篇)等刊物发表论文10余篇。曾获2012年全国百篇优秀博士论文奖。担任Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation,《中国社会科学》,《经济研究》,《管理世界》、《世界经济》、《经济学季刊》等期刊匿名审稿人。

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