联系我们

 
 

您当前所在的位置:首页 > 学术科研 > 学术讲座 >

Type revelation and cooperation

作者:admin来源:发布时间:2018-05-10 06:31:00 浏览次数:53

内容简介: 暨南大学产业大数据应用与经济决策研究实验室学术报告(三)时间:5月13日(周五)上午10:00-11:30地点:科学馆506主讲人:杨扬博士、助理

暨南大学产业大数据应用与经济决策研究实验室学术报告(三)
 

时间:513(周五)上午10:00-11:30
地点:科学馆
506
主讲人:杨扬博士、助理教授
 

讲座题目:Type revelation and cooperation

 内容简介: This paper studies a two-round prisoner’s dilemma game with rematching between rounds. The game involves two player types, ‘Giver’ and ‘Taker’, with the former having more cooperative intrinsic preferences than the latter. Two information conditions are compared: in one, player types are revealed before actions are chosen. In the other, types remain private information. We study this game using perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) analysis and a laboratory experiment. The lab observations support the perfect PBE prediction that, 1) when the types are revealed, the Givers discriminate over types while the Takers don't; 2) when the types are not revealed, Givers and Takers both only discriminate over opponents’ past choices in the second round. However, while the theory predicts a higher cooperation rate would be achieved when the type information are not revealed, the experimental results show the opposite. We argue that the observations imply that indirect reciprocity and bounded rationality combine to drive the decisions away from the equilibrium prediction. "

 

主讲人简介:杨扬,中山大学岭南学院助理教授,北京大学数学和经济学双学士、中科院数学与系统科学研究所硕士、荷兰阿姆斯特丹大学和丁伯根研究所经济学博士。在Journal of Economic PsychologySSCI)上发表论文一篇。

 

上一篇:Who Are More Naïve? High or Low Trustors
下一篇:Pennies for Your Thoughts: Costly Product Consi

学院概况 

师资队伍 

学术科研 

人才培养 

党建工会 

校友之家