暨南大学产业大数据应用与经济决策研究实验室学术报告（三）
时间：
地点：科学馆506
主讲人：
讲座题目：Type revelation and cooperation
内容简介：
This paper studies a two-round prisoner’s dilemma game with rematching between rounds. The game involves two player types, ‘Giver’ and ‘Taker’, with the former having more cooperative intrinsic preferences than the latter. Two information conditions are compared: in one, player types are revealed before actions are chosen. In the other, types remain private information. We study this game using perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) analysis and a laboratory experiment. The lab observations support the perfect PBE prediction that, 1) when the types are revealed, the Givers discriminate over types while the Takers don't; 2) when the types are not revealed, Givers and Takers both only discriminate over opponents’ past choices in the second round. However, while the theory predicts a higher cooperation rate would be achieved when the type information are not revealed, the experimental results show the opposite. We argue that the observations imply that indirect reciprocity and bounded rationality combine to drive the decisions away from the equilibrium prediction. "
主讲人简介：杨扬，中山大学岭南学院助理教授，北京大学数学和经济学双学士、中科院数学与系统科学研究所硕士、荷兰阿姆斯特丹大学和丁伯根研究所经济学博士。在Journal of Economic Psychology（SSCI）上发表论文一篇。
